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"EVIDENTIALISM": A THEOLOGIAN'S RESPONSE 
Gordon D. Kaufman 
Current discussions of "evidentialism" seem to presuppose essentially traditional theistic 
conceptions and formulations. For many theologians. however, these have become prob-
lematic because of (a) the rise of a new consciousness of the significance of religious 
pluralism; (b) the emergence of theories about the ways in which our symbolic frames of 
orientation shape all our experiencing and thinking; (c) a growing awareness that signifi-
cant responsibility for some of the major evils of the twentieth century must be laid to our 
religious traditions. Since recent discussion of "evidentialism" continues to employ tradi-
tional symbols and concepts without sensitivity to these matters, it has not attracted much 
interest among contemporary theologians. 
In recent years direct conversation between philosophers and theologians has 
been somewhat muted. Many theologians have been suspicious of the critical 
and skeptical spirit of much modem philosophy, and have not felt that their 
work required extensive study of and sophistication in contemporary philosophy; 
many philosophers, for their part, if they concerned themselves with theological 
issues at all, have done so more in terms defined by the great figures out of the 
past, instead of informing themselves about, and engaging themselves with, 
major questions which contemporary theologians find central. I In consequence, 
although lively and important discussions are going on both among contem-
porary theologians and contemporary philosophers of religion, there seems to 
be, unfortunately, less direct dialogue between these groups than one might 
hope for. Doubtless each group can give reasons why they find the discussions 
going on in the other less than helpful. I will leave it to the philosophers to speak 
for themselves on this question; but I would like to take this opportunity, as a 
theologian, to suggest some reasons why the current philosophical discussions 
of "evidentialism" may not capture much interest among many contemporary 
theologians-however important they are in their own right, ann however much 
they help to show, as Robert Audi and William Wainwright have put it, that 
the "field of philosophy of religion is probably more vital today than at any 
other time in this century."2 In my remarks here, of course, I am speaking only 
for myself, not for contemporary theology generally or even for some particular 
group of contemporary theologians; but I don't believe that what I intend to say 
is completely idiosyncratic. 
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I. 
The discussions of "evidentialism" which I have read, though manifesting 
much technical virtuosity and bringing to bear important insights and subtleties 
developed in recent philosophical reflection, seem to be largely a contemporary 
extension of issues having a long history in western religious reflection. They 
do not, however, appear to reflect much attention to an issue to which contem-
porary theologians have increasingly felt they must address themselves, namely, 
the problematic character of certain basic presuppositions of this tradition itself. 
Since, thus, these discussions continue to take for granted assumptions which 
are today in question for a good many theologians, it should not be surprising 
if they do not have a large impact on contemporary theological discussions. Let 
me try to explain. 
Evidentialism of a sort-what I will call a "soft" or "weak" evidentialism-has 
been a principal mark of Christian and Jewish faiths from their very beginning; 
and it has characterized these faiths throughout their long histories. According 
to most historians the faith of Israel (the acknowledged parent of both Judaism 
and Christianity) was born in connection with the escape of some slaves from 
Egypt under the leadership of Moses: Moses taught these escaping slaves that 
it was the God Yahweh who had made possible their departure from Egypt. 
They decided, therefore, to make a covenant with this God, binding themselves 
and their descendants to him-I use the masculine pronoun advisedly-and 
promising to keep his commandments. Thus, from the very beginning of Israel's 
special relationship to Yahweh, certain experiences-the occurrence of certain 
events interpreted in a particular way-provided grounds for faith: this was a 
faith that was based (at least in part) on what were taken to be evidences of 
Yahweh's activity and of his special concern for and care of Israel. 
The further growth and development of this faith (as reflected in Old Testament 
writings and eventually in the New Testament) occurred also in connection with 
historical events and experiences, and the interpretation of these as expressing 
God's dealings with the Hebrew people (and later on, with Gentile Christians 
as well). The understanding of this historical and experiential relationship was 
often relatively crude. For example, the circle of historical writers who put 
together the book of Deuteronomy presented a fairly simplistic reward-and-
punishment interpretation of history: events promoting Israel's well-being-vic-
tory in warfare, the breaking of droughts, the healing of diseases-were seen as 
direct evidence of God's intervention in human history in behalf of Israel; in 
contrast, the occurrence of catastrophic events--4lefeat in war, famine, crop 
failures, and the like-were evidences of God's judgment on, and quite proper 
punishment of, the people of Israel for failing to keep the covenant. Many of 
the prophets. also. spoke in these relatively straightforward "evidentialist" terms. 
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Stories in which God is reported to have intervened in human affairs in miracles 
are not infrequent in these writings: as signs to Gideon, for example, God wet 
with dew a fleece which Gideon left out on the ground one night, and the next 
night God kept the fleece dry though the ground all around it was wet (Judges 
6:36-40); in a contest between Elijah and the prophets of Ba 'ai, God sent down 
fire from heaven, at Elijah's request, to ignite a sacrifice which earlier had been 
thoroughly soaked with water (I Kings 18:30-40); and so on. 
As might be expected with this sort of "evidentialist" understanding ofIsrael' s 
relationship to God, when the political and military destruction of the two Israelite 
kingdoms occurred, with many of the people carried off into exile, a severe 
crisis in the people's faith erupted. Many were persuaded that Yahweh was either 
not as well disposed toward Israel as had been believed, or was not as powerful 
as had been supposed. The catastrophe here was more than the simplistic historical 
reward-and-punishment conception of the Deuteronomists and others could bear. 
If faith in Yahweh was to survive, a more satisfactory interpretation of massive 
human suffering-always a severe problem for theistic worldviews-had to be 
found. This was the occasion, thus, for the appearance of the notion of "vicarious 
suffering" which would bring about the salvation of others, as set out in the 
"servant songs" of Second Isaiah (42: 1-4; 49:5-7; 53; etc.). The problem of the 
inequitable distribution of goods and evils in history was not really resolved, 
however, especially on the level of the individual believer, as one can see clearly 
in the powerful protests against God found in Job, Ecclesiastes and many of the 
Psalms. It was, of course, because Israel's faith was so largely grounded on the 
presupposition that there are clear evidences in human experience and history of 
God's activity and nature, that issues of this sort were so difficult to handle. 
The so-called problem of evil has, thus, been with us for a very long time: it is 
an inevitable corollary of a faith that presumptuously supposes it knows more 
about God and God's activity than human finitude permits. I will return to this 
point later. This dialectical tension between traditional faith in God and the 
human experience of evil has also, of course, been a central issue in the modem 
evidentialist debates. 
In the New Testament a quasi-evidentialist religious orientation is continued. 
Jesus is presented as a wonder-worker, and the healings and other miracles which 
he performs are seen as evidences of his divine mission. The most critical event 
for Jesus' followers was his crucifixion, which directly contradicted the disciples' 
expectations, thus giving rise to hard questions about whether Jesus' mission 
was really from God. The rise of the Christian church out of the ashes of 
pessimism and despair, however, with the triumphant claim that Jesus had "risen 
from the dead," brought about a remarkable christological creativity which cul-
minated finally in the belief that Jesus had ascended into heaven to "sit at the 
right hand" of God the Father Almighty. All of these developments, it is to be 
38 Faith and Philosophy 
noted, were grounded on appeals to supposedly historical and experiential data, 
taken to be evidence for the Christian understanding both of who Christ was and 
of what God was doing in and through him. 
Western religious traditions, thus, both Jewish and Christian, are deeply 
grounded in a quasi-evidentialist approach to religious understanding, and it 
should occasion no surprise, therefore, that the problems of evidentialism continu-
ally reappear in the religious reflection carried on within these traditions. Jewish 
and Christian reflection on the Nazi holocaust presents an obvious contemporary 
example of this, but there are many other problems today--e.g., those raised 
by contemporary biological and medical knowledge, or by the development of 
nuclear weaponry-which also pose severe difficulties for theistic faith.' 
In the course of the development of modem philosophy a new concentration 
on the question of what might properly be counted as genuine evidence for 
religious belief appeared. The rise of modem science seemed to many philoso-
phers to show that knowledge of near certainty is attainable by humans, but only 
under carefully specified conditions (which were, of course, always under 
debate). In particular, the kinds and qualities of evidence for cognitive claims 
which experience could supply were thoroughly investigated, and (as a result of 
the work of Hume and Kant and others) the possibility of making warrantable 
metaphysical and theological claims on the basis of experiential evidence came 
to seem increasingly dubious. During this period many traditional religious 
beliefs, particularly those connected with the reality and nature of God, were 
SUbjected to tests contrived to meet the demands of a new "strong" or "hard" 
evidentialism, tests that went, in the stringency of their requirements, far beyond 
anything heretofore seen in western religious reflection. This modem eviden-
tialism, Nicholas Wolterstorff suggests, is characterized by a double thesis: "(a) 
if one is rationally to believe some theistic proposition, one must believe it on 
the basis of others of one's beliefs that constitute good evidence for it; and (b) 
one is overall justified in believing some theistic proposition only if it is rational 
for one to believe it. "4 On this view an evidentialist challenge could properly be 
addressed to anyone holding theistic beliefs; an evidentialist defense might then 
be presented if someone attempted to meet this challenge by providing the 
appropriate arguments. The current discussion of "evidentialism," so far as I can 
see, is essentially a continuation of these debates running through the modem 
period. It has now, however, become considerably refined, in the light of recent 
critiques of the modem quest for cognitive certainty and of the "foundationalism" 
which this spawned and nurtured. This discussion is quite illuminating within 
its own limits, but it begs issues which have become urgent for many contempo-
rary theologians. Instead of exploring it further, therefore, I want now to attempt 
to explain why (in my opinion) this whole long evidentialist religious tradition, 
EVIDENTIALISM 39 
going all the way back to the biblical origins of Christian and Jewish faiths, now 
confronts questions which demand a rather different approach. 
II. 
Evidentialist arguments are addressed to specific beliefs held by adherents of a 
particular religious tradition: does the evidence favor belief A or does it, for the 
most part, weigh against it? (In the recent discussions this issue has been refocused 
into an inquiry whether the demand for "evidence" with respect to religious belief 
is rationally appropriate or justified.) In these arguments, therefore, the issues 
taken up are those suggested by explicit claims made within the tradition; the tra-
dition provides both the specific claims and the particular terminology on which 
the debates focus. In this respect the questions considered in the evidentialist de-
bates are internal to the tradition (though they may be posed, of course, from quite 
alien standpoints): attention remains focused on this or that particular concept or 
belief found within the tradition itself. Wider questions, about the nature of tra-
ditions or worIdviews themselves and how these function in human experience and 
thinking, do not ordinarily come up for direct consideration in these discussions; 
these may, in fact, be regarded as "sociological" or "historical" matters, which are 
not pertinent to the strictly "philosophical" inquiry into the "truth-claims" being 
made within the tradition. However, for those who believe that religious concepts, 
questions and claims are not "free-standing," but are in significant ways a function 
of the overarching religious worldviews or traditions (or "ways of life") within 
which they appear, philosophical priority must be given to questions about the 
status, function, and even "validity" of these overarching symbolical frameworks 
or worldviews themselves; and issues strictly internal to a long-standing historical 
tradition may thus become of secondary interest. As Wolterstorffhas put it, "issues 
of rationality are always situation specific."5 Since the intellectual situation in 
which many theologians now find themselves has changed significantly in recent 
years, it should not surprise us if "those abstract and highly general theses of 
evidentialism no longer look very interesting."6 
What I would like to do now is sketch briefly the shift in interest and attention 
that has occurred for many contemporary theologians. A number of factors seem 
to be involved in this: I will mention three interconnected ones here. First, let 
us take note of the rise of a new consciousness of the significance of religious 
pluralism. There has always been, of course, awareness of the plurality of 
religious traditions and claims. Indeed, the Old Testament can be read as essen-
tially a record of the struggle between rival religious traditions, each well aware 
of the others: the story of Elijah and the prophets of Ba'al (referred to above) 
provides an obvious example. Similarly, the rise of Christianity is portrayed in 
the New Testament as in tension with Judaism on the one side, and the many 
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Hellenistic cults on the other. All of these stories are told with polemical intent, 
and this has been continued through most of subsequent Christian history: the 
fundamental truth of the basic Christian claims was taken for granted, as was 
the untruth, even he diabolical nature, of the claims of the church's opponents. 
Recently, however, among many Christian theologians (as well as others) there 
has been a striking change with regard to these matters. Instead of continuing 
the traditional attempts to make definitive normative claims about "Christian 
truth" or "the Christian revelation," many now see the plurality among religious 
traditions, as well as the enormous pluralism within the Christian tradition, as 
themselves of profound human meaning and importance: what seems required 
now, therefore, rather than polemical pronouncements, is careful and appreciative 
study, together with an attitude of openness to what can be learned from this 
great diversity of ways of understanding the world, and the human place within 
the world. 7 When this kind of attitude appears, the diverse ways in which different 
religious traditions provide orientation and meaning for human life becomes a 
central point of interest, and it becomes important to re-examine Christian claims 
about "truth" and about "divine revelation" in light of these new issues, and in 
relation to corresponding understandings and claims in other traditions. It now 
seems apparent to many theologians that such central Christian symbols as "God" 
and "Christ" are much more complex than appears on the surface; and before 
one can understand all that is really going on in them, it is necessary to learn a 
good bit more about how religious symbols and traditions in general function. 
It is expected that comparison with other symbols and practices-for example, 
those of Buddhists or Jews (or Marxists )-will illuminate dimensions of Christian 
faith and life and symbols which have remained hidden to direct internalist 
approaches to theological questions. 8 
A second important development lying behind the shift in consciousness of 
many contemporary theologians (closely related to the first) is the emergence of 
new theories about the ways in which cultural and linguistic symbolic or concep-
tual frames shape all our experiencing and thinking. Theories about worldviews, 
about the holistic character of cultural and religious systems, about the role of 
historically relative "paradigms" (to use Thomas Kuhn's word) in shaping scien-
tific and other thinking, about the respects in which thought is bound up with 
language, etc., and theories about the place and significance of religious symbols 
and symbol-systems in all of this, are becoming increasingly influential among 
theologians. 9 These sorts of theory (taken together with the new sympathetic 
consciousness of religious pluralism) have given rise in theologians to a new 
self-consciousness about the extraordinarily complex and problematic character 
of all so-called "religious truth-claims," including those made by Christian faith. 
Such claims, it now becomes apparent, are always in fact articulated in highly 
symbolical language-language with many levels of meaning, language the pri-
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mary function of which is not so much to articulate "truths" about the world and 
the human (as we in our scientific age might be inclined to think about these 
matters) as it is to present a framework from within which basic orientation and 
meaning for the whole of human life can be found. Given this understanding of 
religious language and ideas, it does not seem appropriate to move directly to 
questions about, for example, the "evidences" which can (or cannot) be brought 
forward for certain (usually quite traditional) beliefs about God. Before that 
question can be addressed, such issues as the following must be taken up: How 
and why did human beings construct this symbol "God" in the first place? What 
range of functions has it performed and what patterns of meaning has it been 
associated with, in its long history. What consequences for human life have 
followed from its employment? We cannot take it for granted that this symbol 
has always meant essentially the same thing; nor can we assume that the meaning 
it carried in earlier periods of history (whether biblical, or the high Middle Ages, 
or the Reformation) is the meaning which it should (or can) carry for us today. [0 
Before we can intelligently talk about "evidences" with respect to beliefs about 
God, we must resolve for ourselves a number of important prior issues: How 
should God be conceived today? What sorts of considerations bear on this issue, 
and why? What alternative proposals are available to us? What criteria for 
assessing these can be brought forward? And so on. It is not possible responsibly 
to discuss questions about "evidences" respecting God-i.e., the reality, and 
not simply what is all too easily assumed to be "the traditional notion" of 
God-without first addressing in some detail these questions about what we are 
seeking evidences for. Careful exploration of these issues discloses a whole nest 
of enormously complex problems. 
The third development driving contemporary theologians into major reassess-
ments of traditional assumptions about the Christian tradition is closely intercon-
nected with the two I have just mentioned, and it may to some extent underlie 
and motivate them. It is our unexpected confrontation with utterly appalling evil 
in the twentieth century-two horrible world wars, the Nazi holocaust and other 
instances of genocide, the ecological crisis, the use of atomic bombs in World 
War II and the ever-present possibility of nuclear obliteration of the human race, 
and so on. The problem of evil, as I noted above, has always posed serious 
difficulties for theistic belief, and it is very much an issue in the evidentialism 
debates; it should come as no surprise, therefore, that the massive evils of the 
twentieth century have raised once again the old problems about the sovereignty 
and goodness of God. But now a new element has been added to these ancient 
issues, driving them to a deeper level: it now seems that Christian faith, Christian 
ways of understanding the world and the human place within the world, a 
powerful Christian sense of divine authorization and thus superiority over other 
religions, Christian imperialism, Christian racism and sexism, and other charac-
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teristics and qualities of the Christian religion and of "Christian civilization," 
bear some significant responsibility for most of the evils I have just mentioned. 
Christian theologians today have thus been driven, in a way unprecedented 
historically, to ask some hard questions about Christian faith, practices and 
institutions, questions that force close examination of the very symbols and ideas 
that have traditionally informed this faith and these practices: What has gone 
wrong here? How could Christian practices, attitudes and ideas have led to these 
horrors? In what ways have the central Christian symbols-the image/concepts 
of God and of Christ (as these have been received and understood)-themselves 
somehow contributed to this? With profoundly disturbing questions of this sort 
about the actual impact of Christianity on human affairs, it is not surprising that 
theologians (along with many others) have begun to tum with new interest to 
see what other religious (and humanistic) traditions have to offer; and have 
inquired with new intensity into the ways-Dften obscure and devious-in which 
Christian symbols, practices and institutions have actually functioned in human 
life. Learning from Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, radical feminists, and others, they 
have begun to apply what Paul Ricoeur has called a "hermeneutics of suspicion" 
to their own traditions; and this has made it clear that it is no longer theologically 
responsible to adopt uncritically an accepting attitude toward traditional beliefs 
or ideas. Radical reconstruction of central concepts and symbols of the Christian 
faith-including "God" and "Christ"-now seems to many to be required; to 
continue to inquire into "evidences" which bear on this or that detail of traditional 
beliefs seems to be fiddling while all of Rome is afire. 
III. 
I cannot here outline my own approach to these difficult problems of theological 
deconstruction and reconstruction; I have discussed various aspects of them in 
detail elsewhere. 11 I would like to conclude my remarks, however, by sketching 
briefly my understanding of the sort of setting within which many theologians 
today work, as they take up questions having to do with primary religious symbols 
such as "God." All three of the points I have just made-the new consciousness 
of the significance of religious pluralism, the growing awareness of the way in 
which all our ideas are shaped by the cultural and symbolic framework of 
orientation within which we are living and thinking, the sensitivity to Christian 
responsibility for certain aspects of the massive evils which confront us today-
tend to promote a deep humility about the religious and philosophical traditions 
we have inherited and a profound questioning of the propriety of making dogmatic 
claims of any sort with regard to their ultimate "reality" or "truth." There is a 
growing consciousness that is to say, that at its deepest level life confronts us 
finally as Mystery, and that this awareness has often been softened, and sometimes 
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significantly obscured, by our religious symbolisms, which seem to offer us 
answers to our most difficult questions. 12 Today we are forced to take with greater 
seriousness the fact that we do not know, and we can see no way in which we 
will ever be able to plumb, the true meaning of human life-Dr whether there 
even is such a thing. We have many important questions about ourselves and 
our world to which we cannot find definitive answers: Are some forms or modes 
of life more "authentically" human than others, and how could one decide this? 
What is a truly "good" life, and how would one possibly know? Are there some 
identifiable central problems, or malformations, or diseases of human existence 
or the human spirit (sin) for which lasting solutions or cures (salvation) are 
available? Are some religious or philosophical or moral or scientific traditions 
of more value than others in addressing such matters, or are all in various ways 
both helpful and misleading, leaving us in a problematic relativism? Should the 
world, and human life within it, be understood most fundamentally with reference 
to "God"? to "material energies"? to "Brahman",? to "Life"'? to "Sunyata (emp-
tiness)"? Or should we try to banish all such questions from our minds and live 
out our existence, so far as possible, simply in terms of the day to day problems 
that confront us? This inscrutable Mystery-Dr these many mysteries-provides 
the ultimate context of our existence. From the earliest period of self-conscious 
human life, as far as we can see, men and women have grappled with this 
situation, and in the various great systems of religious symbolism and ritual, 
which they have created in consequence, they have found such partial answers 
as they could. None of these pictures or conceptions or stories of the world, 
however-these frames of orientation-fits all dimensions of experience per-
fectly, and in consequence there have always been persons like Job and 
Ecclesiastes, Camus and Sartre, who have cried out against the unintelligibility 
of what they were living through. 
In western religious traditions this ultimate mystery of and behind human 
existence is usually identified as God; and in affirmations that God is "infinite" 
or "absolute," "transcendent" or "ineffable," believers have reminded themselves 
that this One whom they worship is to be understood ultimately as mystery. 
This, however, is a highly dialectical point, and it is important that we see its 
implications for our understanding of how we talk about God and what we can 
say about God. On the one hand, the image/concept "God" seems intended to 
symbolize that-whatever it might be-which brings true human fulfillment; 
that is, in speaking of "God" we seek to attend to the mystery in its aspect as 
source and ground of our being and our well-being, as that on which, therefore, 
we can rely absolutely. But on the other hand, as the ultimate mystery, God is 
beyond our knowledge and understanding. This implies and requires an acknowl-
edgment of our unknowing with respect to God, an acknowledgment (that is to 
say) that we do not know how the images and metaphors in terms of which we 
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conceive God apply, since they are always our own metaphors and images, 
infected with our limitations, interests, and biases. (For just this reason we dare 
not claim that they have been directly revealed by God.) Only in and with such 
acknowledgment does the symbol "God" turn us-by indirection-toward the 
ultimate source and context of our humanity. 
The difficult dialectic to which I am here attempting to point is not merely of 
intellectual interest: it is an expression of something which has always been 
regarded as central to religious piety, namely repentance. Repentance is certainly 
a human act (or attitude), but it has the peculiar dialectical character of being 
an act of self-renouncing, an act of giving up our own claims. This self-renouncing 
must include, I want to emphasize now, our claims to certainty of knowledge. 
If we try to overcome and control the mystery within which we live-for example, 
through philosophical or theological ideas in which we take ourselves to be in 
a position to present conclusive evidences and arguments, or through religious 
rituals or practices which promise us a secure place in the ultimate scheme of 
things-we sin against God, as we try to make ourselves the ultimate disposers 
of our lives and destiny. We must, then, repent: we must turn around from this 
posture, which we all too often take up with respect to the ultimate mystery of 
life, and move toward a recognition that our destiny is ultimately in God's hands 
not ours; that is, that it remains mystery to us. 
With this emphasis on our faith in and dependence on what is ultimately 
mystery I do not mean to suggest that there is no place for careful and sustained 
theological and philosophical reflection on our religious symbols and practices. 
Only in and through such reflection, perhaps, are we enabled to perceive the 
dialectic in the concept of God to which we are attempting here to attend, a 
dialectic which must inevitably involve a certain agnosticism. Not a cynical 
agnosticism, of course, that is destructive of everything humans believe in and 
need, but that agnosticism which indirectly opens us to what is beyond our 
present world, opens us to that which we do not yet know but which will be 
creative of our future. Faith is the "letting go" (as Kierkegaard put it) of all 
attachments, including specifically and especially our religious and theological 
attachments; it is just these idolatries which shield us from-and thus close us 
off from-that ultimate mystery in which both our being and our fulfillment are 
grounded. 
There is a sphere which we humans can (and should) largely control, and our 
philosophical and theological work takes place within that sphere. But just this 
recognition raises indirectly the question about that which we do not control, 
that which we do not and cannot understand, analyze, explore, prove-the 
ultimate mystery, a mystery which we may (in faith) choose to call "God." In 
my view-as a Christian theologian aware how deeply disturbing are the questions 
which religious pluralism raises for Christian conceptions of humanity and reality, 
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and conscious of the extent to which all of our thinking and arguing is a function 
of the symbolic and conceptual frames within which it occurs, and persuaded 
of the Christian culpability for much evil in the world-the debates focusing on 
"evidences" for this or that particular detail in traditional beliefs about God are 
simply failing to notice or take account of the depths of this mystery within 
which we humans live. In consequence-unhappily-they often trivialize the 
very ideas and beliefs which they are seeking to explore and understand. Questions 
of this sort must always be approached with a profound awareness of their 
ultimate gravity, difficulty, and obscurity, and with a sensitivity to the ultimacy 
of that mystery to which faith, with its talk of God, is seeking to respond. 
Philosophical reflection is indispensable for theology; and theological reflection 
may have some important insights to offer philosophers. It is one of my deepest 
hopes, therefore, that conversation between their tribes will increase, as each 
makes whatever contribution it can to the ongoing human task of discovering 
how to live-and perhaps even to flourish!-in our very difficult world. 
Harvard University, The Divinity School 
NOTES 
I. An important exception to this generalization is Joseph Runzo, who has carefully explored 
contemporary theological reflection on the problem of "relativism" (see Reason, Relativism and God 
[New York: SI. Martin's Press, 1986]). 
2. See Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment: New Essays in the Philosophy of 
Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 9. 
3. In my little book, Theology for a Nuclear Age (Philadelphia: Westminster Press and Manchester: 
University of Manchester Press, 1985), I have discussed some of the theological issues which the 
nuclear crisis poses. 
4. "The Migration of the Theistic Arguments: From Natural Theology to Evidentialist Apologetics," 
in Audi and Wainwright, op. cit., pp. 38-39, n. 2. (See also "Can Belief in God Be Rational if it 
has no Foundations?" in Faith and Rationality, ed. A. Plantinga and N. Wolterstorff [Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983], pp. 135-86). In my opinion Wolterstorff is correct in his 
claim that the modem "evidentialist" debates about the grounding of faith are of a stringency, and 
perhaps a motivation, unknown in earlier periods. His article goes on to suggest, however, that this 
appearance of what I call "hard evidentialism" was a kind of aberration, rather than a quite natural 
and proper development (in a new epistemological situation), of the long-standing weaker eviden-
tialism of the tradition; and that today-now that we see its limitations, largely derived from the 
dubious "foundationalist" assumptions characteristic of much modem epistemology-the problems 
for faith and theology to which it gave rise are dissolved. This conclusion seems to me misleading. 
As I am trying to show in this paper, the problems connected with the basic evidentialism of western 
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